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Abstract 
Classical realist thought provides a diagnosis of the significance nuclear weapons that calls 
into question the very possibility of politics in the nuclear age. While sharing similarities with 
this outlook, critical theoretic reflections suggest a more expansive consideration of the 
nuclear condition as underpinned by combinations of dystopian fears of nuclear destruction 
and utopian visions of nuclear futures. Most prominently Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory 
intimates an understanding of the nuclear condition as one that is rendered tolerable so long 
as nuclear technologies are associated with and related to innovation, progress and modernity. 
The study of the technopolitics of the nuclear condition might thus look not only to classical 
realists’ concern with ‘Death in the Nuclear Age’ but also incorporate corresponding critical 
awareness of claims to the life-sustaining applications of nuclear technologies in areas such 
as energy production, industry and medicine. Applying an ‘aporetic’ form of immanent 
critique, and to exemplify how the international politics of the nuclear age has often been 
predicated on efforts to distinguish and relate different kinds of nuclear technologies, the 
paper revisits the US-led post-war vision of ‘Atoms for Peace’ and compares it to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s contemporary ‘How the Atom Benefits Life’ 
campaign. 
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Introduction 
In February 2012 the CBS-affiliated channel KMOV, based in St. Louis, Missouri, broadcast 
a short news feature entitled ‘Life Down Under: Survival Condos Promise to Protect Against 
a Nuclear Attack’ (KMOV 2012) as part of its ‘News 4 St. Louis’. The feature detailed a visit 
to a former US Air Force Atlas F missile silo ‘somewhere in Kansas’ (the exact location kept 
secret) to report on the development of a ‘Luxury Survival Condo’ complex under the 
supervision of the project developer, Larry Hall. In response to questions from a seemingly 
incredulous reporter, Hall confirmed that residents of St. Louis were among those that had 
expressed an interest in the underground complex (one of a projected three in development), 
where condos retail at a reported $1.5m for a half floor, $3m for a full floor (Dowling 2014; 
see also Luxury Survival Condo, 2016). Built in 1960, the silo was ‘hardened’ to protect the 
nuclear-armed missile it housed. No longer in use for its original purpose, Hall’s project has 
worked to build a technological support system for comfort living into the 175ft deep 
reinforced concrete structure, designed to allow residents to survive with a in-built supply of 
food, water, clean air and electricity to last up to five years in the event of a nuclear attack 
(or, indeed, according to Hall, in the event of any other kind of global catastrophe). As well 
as residences the condo would host a grocery store, medical, rooms, dental office, shooting 
range, indoor dog park, movie theatre and indoor pool and water slide amongst its other 
facilities (see Logic Integration 2013).   
The ‘functionality’ of the complex as a whole would be based around integrated 
computer systems that as well as monitoring and sustaining physical living conditions such as 
air filtration and water sensors, would also ensure the provision of state of the art audio visual 
facilities, lighting control and entertainment systems for residents. The intention, according to 
system designer Bill Craig, is that in the event of catastrophe residents could ‘live here and 
enjoy the facility, not just survive’ (in Logic Integration 2013: 1:38). Ultimately the challenge 
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and the reward of the project from a design perspective was that it ‘…took a facility intended 
to destroy and turned it into a facility intended to preserve’ (in Logic Integration 2013: 3:45, 
emphasis added).  
Marketing the dream of luxury survival living to the 1% of Americans that would be 
able to afford it (Foster 2016: 295), the Luxury Survival Condos might be regarded as simply 
the latest manifestation of what Joseph Masco (2009) has termed the ‘bunker society’. During 
the Cold War, as Masco forensically details and illustrates, the construction of purpose-built 
underground nuclear shelters constituted a key element of federal civil defense efforts from 
the mid-1950s onwards. As an attempted means of state management of collective nuclear 
fear, Masco argues, during the Cold War these ‘…built spaces stocked with  state-of-the-art 
technologies and commodities presented a utopian vision of an invulnerable America closed 
off from the outside world but still functioning perfectly’ (2009, 13).  
Yet while clearly continuous with that lineage the Luxury Survival Condos are 
distinctive in that as opposed to being purpose-built, they are instead re-purposed: the disused 
nuclear missile silo has been transformed into a living space. In the design and marketing of 
the condos the survivability of the structure and its status as a former nuclear weapon facility 
as selling points are blended together with the everyday comforts provided by its hotel-like 
furnishings and features. The condos are also precisely for that reason an interesting kind of 
‘nuclear thing’, to use the terminology employed by Gabrielle Hecht (2012), where Hecht 
argues that we can identify different manifestations of ‘nuclearity’ as ‘a technopolitical 
phenomenon that emerges from political and cultural configurations of technical and 
scientific things, from the social relations where knowledge is produced’ (2012: 15, emphasis 
in original). Hecht’s understanding of nuclearity points to an approach that seeks to analyse 
not just how ‘nuclear things’ are distinguished as being uniquely different from ‘non-nuclear 
things’, but also how nuclear things are distinguished from – and related to – each other in 
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contextually specific ways (see also the editors’ Introduction and Sonja D. Schmid’s 
contribution to this special issue). The Luxury Survival Condos serve as an exemplar in this 
respect, taking as they do an artefact of the nuclear age once used to house nuclear weapons 
but now marketed in large part on the assumed virtues of the facility for sustaining human 
lives in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. 
This theme of configurations of life-destroying and life-sustaining nuclear things as a 
technopolitical phenomenon is pursued in more detail in this paper, and is explored in 
relation to the points of overlap and distinction between classical realist and critical theoretic 
reflections on the ‘nuclear condition’ in respect of this theme. Classical realist thought 
provides a diagnosis of the nuclear weapons condition that, at times, seems to call into 
question the very possibility of politics in the nuclear age. Critical theoretic reflections 
suggest a more expansive understanding of the nuclear condition and its underpinning 
combinations of dystopian fears of nuclear destruction and utopian visions of nuclear-
powered futures. Elements of each, the paper suggests, can be brought together to inform an 
immanent critique of the nuclear condition as not just a prevailing situation of global 
vulnerability and human endangerment, but also as a situation conditional upon a series of 
assumed distinctions about the nature and applications of nuclear technologies. In particular 
the paper argues that while classical realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz 
focused extensively on the condition of ‘Death in the Nuclear Age’, the work of critical 
theorists such as Herbert Marcuse points to a wider concern with the ways in which the 
prospect of nuclear death exists alongside and is often bound up with claims to the life-
sustaining properties and applications of ‘the atom’. The latter orients us towards 
understanding the contemporary nuclear condition as being predicated upon a more complex 
political and cultural configuration of nuclear things.  By way of illustration, the paper details 
how the post-war ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative in particular exemplified a vision of nuclear 
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power that split the ‘peaceful atom’ from the ‘military atom’ in a manner that still remains at 
the core of efforts to regulate the contemporary nuclear condition at an international level. To 
evaluate the continuing significance of such understandings the paper then turns to a 
discussion of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s campaign to demonstrate ‘How the 
Atom Benefits Life’. 
 
Classical realism and the nuclear weapons condition 
My own view is that the development of these weapons can make, if wisely handled, 
the problem of preventing war, not more hopeless, but more hopeful, than it would 
otherwise have been, and that this is so not merely because it intensifies the urgency 
of our hopes, but because it provides new and healthy avenues of approach. In 
developing these avenues the fact that there is so far-reaching a technical 
inseparability of the constructive uses of atomic energy from the destructive ones – a 
fact that at first sight might appear to render the problem only more difficult – this 
fact is precisely the central vital element that can make effective action possible. If we 
are clear on this, we shall have some guide for the future (Oppenheimer 1955 [1946]: 
16-17). 
Coming in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons in the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, J. Robert Oppenheimer’s reflections on atomic energy indicated a hope not only 
that the manifest destructiveness of nuclear weapons would lead the world towards avoidance 
of their use, but also that the ‘technical inseparability of the constructive uses of atomic 
energy from the destructive’ provided a residual but crucial prospect for international 
cooperation on the uses of nuclear power.  By contrast to ‘Oppenheimer’s hope’ (Peoples 
2016: 229), the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz in the late 1950s and early 
1960s suggested a profound shift to a new existential global condition with the advent of the 
‘nuclear age’ and a much more pessimistic outlook. Indeed their work during that period – 
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written in the wake of the development of thermonuclear weapons and the corresponding 
increase in the destructive potential of nuclear weapons – is marked by an overriding focus 
on and concern with the global existential threat created by the ‘nuclear revolution’ as a key 
facet of their wider considerations of post-war political modernity (see Craig 2003; van 
Munster and Sylvest 2014; 2016). 
Morgenthau’s (1961) reflections in ‘Death in the Nuclear Age’ stand out as the most 
prominent variation on this theme, declaring that it was the very ‘possibility of nuclear death’ 
had become the defining feature of the nuclear condition: 
The significance of the possibility of nuclear death is that it radically affects the meaning of death, of 
immortality, of life itself. It affects that meaning by destroying most of it. Nuclear destruction is mass 
destruction, both of persons and of things. It signifies the simultaneous destruction of tens of millions of 
people, of whole families, generations, and societies, of all the things that they have inherited and created. 
It signifies the total destruction of whole societies by killing their members, destroying their visible 
achievements, and therefore reducing the survivors to barbarism. Thus nuclear destruction destroys the 
meaning of death by depriving it of its individuality. It destroys the meaning of immortality by making both 
society and history impossible. It destroys the meaning of life by throwing life back upon itself. (1961: 2).  
 
For Morgenthau, it was not simply that the advent of a particular type of technology marked 
the distinction between the nuclear and pre-nuclear age. The constant and realisable 
possibility of nuclear death constituted a ‘qualitative transformation of the meaning of our 
existence’ (Morgenthau 1961: 4), but one which policy makers had generally failed to 
recognise. In terms that arguably parallel his critique of the ‘rationalistic’ approach of 
‘scientific man’ (Morgenthau 1946; see Russell 1991: 119), Morgenthau would later go on to 
lament the fact that ‘while our conditions of life have drastically changed under the impact of 
the nuclear age, we still live in our thoughts and act through our institutions in an age that has 
passed’ (1964: 23), and the fact that at a political level the recognition was lacking 
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developments in the destructive capacity of nuclear armaments had ‘radically altered the 
relations that have existed since the beginning of history between the ends of foreign policy 
and violence as a means to these ends’ (1962: 11).  
The writings of John H. Herz from the late 1950s onwards exhibited a number of 
broadly comparable concerns. In his International Politics in the Atomic Age, originally 
published in 1959, Herz too made the case that the advent of nuclear weapons required both 
scholars and practitioners of international relations to radically rethink the ways in which 
states in the international system interacted with one another. There he characterised the 
‘nuclear situation’ as the  
…unprecedented condition that has befallen mankind. And the first thing to realize is that the situation 
confronts for the first time the whole human race as one group, negatively, it is true, for it is the menace 
rather than the promise, the destructive rather than the constructive and creative potentiality of atomic 
energy that concerns the group as such by placing its very continuance in doubt (1962 [1959]: 304).  
In the wake of the H-bomb’s exponential increase in destructive capacity as well as the 
quantitative increase in the number of nuclear weapons and innovations in their means of 
delivery, contra Oppenheimer’s ‘hope’ Herz made explicit the view that appeals to the 
‘constructive’ applications of atomic energy were a distraction from, or at the very least 
secondary to, its destructive potentiality. Instead of an expectation that international 
cooperation could be anchored in the collaborative development of nuclear power for energy 
production, he argued that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons reinvigorated the idea 
of world government. Indeed it necessitated its development precisely because ‘the chief 
external function of the modern state […] seems to have vanished’ (1962 [1959]: 22) in an 
era where global nuclear destruction had become possible. On this basis Herz identified ‘The 
Atomic Bomb as Attitude Maker’: a weapon so destructive in scale that it also had the 
potential to create global self-conception of ‘what Reinhold Niebuhr has recently called “the 
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minimal community of the fate of the common threat of nuclear annihilation,” because it 
creates what a German author has referred to as “the interdependence of doom”’ (Herz 1962 
[1959]: 303-304). The only true hope for human survival in the nuclear age, Herz contended, 
was that out of the fear of global nuclear annihilation ‘[A]n attitude of “universalist concern”’ 
may yet ‘save us’ (Herz 1962 [1959]: 302).   
 
Critical theory: Aporetic immanent critique of nuclear modernity 
In short, Morgenthau and Herz identified the nuclear condition as a nuclear weapons 
condition. Yet while emphasising the exceptional characteristics of nuclear weapons and their 
corresponding conditioning effects on modern international politics, both at times argued that 
this nuclear weapons condition should be regarded as an outgrowth of broader developments 
in technology and accompanying modes of thought. Thus Morgenthau critiqued what he saw 
as a misguided attempt to create ‘political science’ in the 20th century when ‘what is required 
for its [i.e. politics’] mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and moral 
strength of the statesman’ (1946: 10-11), with the assumption that ‘engineering rationality’ 
could be employed to manage the nuclear condition being the ultimate such fallacy. Herz 
identified the technological dimensions of the ‘change which the advent of the “atomic” or 
“nuclear age” has wrought’ as: 
…the accumulated and accumulating impact of a process which can be termed truly revolutionary: the 
process of scientific invention and technological discovery which not only has “perfected” the fission and 
fusion weapons themselves, but in its wake so far has brought jet aircraft with intercontinental range and 
super-sonic speed, missiles with nuclear warheads, and the prospect of nuclear-powered planes and 
submarines with unlimited range, and rockets with equally unlimited range and with guidance to specific 
targets anywhere in the world (Herz 1962 [1959]: 12). 
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Morgenthau and Herz thus articulated broadly comparable views that nuclear weapons should 
be treated as continuous with wider processes of scientific rationalisation and technological 
development. Morgenthau later developed this theme in his (1972) Science: Servant or 
Master?, as did Herz’s (1976) The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics. Both works 
not only suggested that ‘the spectre of nuclear death raised far-reaching questions about 
technology’ (Scheuerman 2009: 571), but also raised fundamental concerns that the nature 
and speed of modern technological development risked replacing politics and statecraft with a 
technocratic form of governance. As William Scheuerman puts it, their ‘…growing anxieties 
about the horrific possibility of nuclear war ultimately encouraged both thinkers [Morgenthau 
and Herz] to develop a critical account of modern technology’ amounting, Scheuerman 
makes the case, to ‘…a distinctively Realist critique of technology’ (2009: 564, emphasis in 
original).  
If the classical realist critique of technology is distinctive from recent (neo)realist 
scholarship – Scheuerman (2009: 563) contrasts it with the work of  Kenneth Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer in particular – it nonetheless exhibits homologies with roughly 
contemporaneous critical reflections on the ‘technological condition’ and a wider strand of 
what has elsewhere been termed as ‘nuclear realism’ (van Munster and Sylvest 2016). Most 
notably Herz (1976) acknowledged resonances of his arguments with Herbert Marcuse’s 
(1964) One-Dimensional Man. Scheuerman caveats this with the caution that ‘it would be a 
mistake to claim that Herz borrowed extensively from the Frankfurt School’, but goes on to 
note ‘…there is undoubtedly some thematic overlap and some common preoccupations’ 
(Scheuerman 2009: 573). Allowing for such common preoccupations, a crucial distinction is 
that whereas Morgenthau and Herz follow a direction of travel that takes them from a 
concern with the nuclear weapons condition to more a more expansive critique of technology, 
the critical thinking of the Frankfurt School might be said to take a similar route in the 
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opposite direction: nuclear technologies are regarded as the apotheosis of the modern 
technological condition, an outgrowth of processes of rationalisation and instrumentalisation 
that precede (see for example Marcuse (1941)) the advent of the nuclear age.  
In part this is evident from how and where nuclear technologies feature in the work of 
thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School, where they often serve as illustrative examples 
of the wider tendencies of ‘industrial society’. Thus, for example, does Theodor Adorno’s 
oft-cited proclamation that ‘there is no universal history leading from savagery to 
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb’ (Adorno 
1972: 343) invoke nuclear weapons as an exemplar in his Negative Dialectics. But it is 
precisely as an exemplar of wider tendencies, in passing, that Adorno makes the citation.  
‘The profit interest and thus the class relationship make up the objective motor of the 
production process which the life of all men hangs by’, Adorno continues, ‘and the primacy 
of which has its vanishing point in the death of all. This also implies the reconciling side of 
the irreconcilable; since nothing else permits men to live, not even a changed life would be 
possible without it’. Similarly, Marcuse’s references to nuclear technologies, most notably in 
his (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 
only briefly book-end his broader critique of ‘technological society’. But the manner in which 
Marcuse discusses nuclear technologies is notable precisely for the way he treats the subject. 
The introduction to the first edition of One-Dimensional Man opens with the passage: 
 
Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the human race also serve to protect 
the very forces which perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the 
search for its potential causes in contemporary industrial society […] We submit to the peaceful 
production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which 
deforms the defenders and that which they defend (Marcuse 1964: xli).  
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In this sense Marcuse uses the spectre of ‘atomic catastrophe’ to exemplify the ‘one-
dimensional’ nature of industrial society, with nuclear technologies cited as emblematic of a 
‘vast, repressive technological civilization that was bringing every aspect of humanity under 
its control’ (Winner 1986: 66). As One-Dimensional Man moves towards it close, Marcuse 
argues that people can tolerate the prospect of an ‘unbearable nightmare’ and can ‘…support 
the continuous creation of nuclear weapons, radioactive fallout…’, but ‘cannot tolerate being 
deprived of the entertainment and education which make them capable of reproducing the 
arrangements for their defense and/or destruction’ (1964: 246). His conclusion consequently 
declares that: 
Auschwitz continues to haunt not the memory but the accomplishments of man – the space flights; the 
rockets and the missiles […] This is the setting in which the great human achievements of science, 
medicine, technology take place: the efforts to save and ameliorate life are the sole promise in the disaster 
[…] Beauty reveals its terror as highly classified nuclear plants and laboratories become “Industrial Parks” 
in pleasing surroundings; Civil Defense Headquarters display a “deluxe fallout-shelter” with wall-to-wall 
carpeting (“soft”), lounge chairs, television , and Scrabble,  “designed as a combination family room during 
peacetime (sic!) and family fallout shelter should war break out” (Marcuse 1964: 248, emphasis added).1 
The quotations cited by Marcuse in this passage  – from an article in The New York Times 
dated November 11, 1960 and displayed at the New York City Civil Defense Headquarters 
(Marcuse 1964: 248, fn1) – serve a clear purpose as a closing illustration to his broader thesis 
on the ‘one-dimensional’ quality of life in industrial society. In ways that call to mind again 
the promises of Larry Hall’s Luxury Survival Condos as well as Masco’s (2009) discussion 
of Cold War America’s ‘bunker society’, the prospect of nuclear catastrophe is, Marcuse 
suggests, assuaged by the association of nuclear war with bucolic imagery, family life and 
home comforts (cf. Cohn 1987), while nuclear technology more generally is placed among 
the pantheon of ‘human achievements’ in ‘science, medicine, technology’.  
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Whilst overlapping to some degree with the classical realist preoccupation with the 
nuclear weapons condition, then, a Marcusian approach points towards analysis of the ways 
in which efforts to manage the ‘perils’ of nuclear weapons have, historically, been bound up 
with the ‘promises’ of nuclear power as a key aspect of efforts to manage and regulate the 
nuclear condition.2 As I have suggested elsewhere (Peoples 2016: 216) this can be 
categorised as ‘nutopianism’: a mode of understanding nuclear power and technology that is 
‘imbued with a spirit of technological optimism in relation to “peaceful” nuclear power, but 
simultaneously qualified by an awareness of the destructive uses and catastrophic 
potentialities of nuclear weapons’ . 
Consideration of this theme – of the promise of material abundance and comforts 
provided by modern technology off-setting the technological capacities for human destruction 
– might provide the grounds for a sustained immanent critique of the contemporary nuclear 
condition. It is, though, arguably an ‘aporetic’ (Benhabib 1986: 163) mode of immanent 
critique, particularly as manifested in, for example, Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man. In the 
1930s the critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School practiced immanent critique 
as a means of comparing society to its own norms, and identifying the contradiction between 
the two within an historical context. In totalitarian states in particular, Enlightenment ideals 
could be used as ‘norms of social critique’ (Kellner 1993: 48) in identifying the remaining 
emancipatory potentialities within contemporary administered societies. Although different in 
substance, this mode of Critical Theory was consistent with Marx’s historical materialist 
critique of the ‘estrangement’ created by an ‘economically mediated process of social 
domination’ (Antonio 1981: 333).  
As Seyla Benhabib (1986: 149) argues, though, with the transition to ‘the critique of 
instrumental reason’, influenced by Max Weber’s account of rationalization and 
disenchantment and exemplified in different ways in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1972 
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[1944]) Dialectic of Enlightenment and Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man, the mode of 
immanent critique that remains is ‘aporetic’ in nature. Although a concern with identifying 
emancipatory potentialities persisted to some degree, that concern became largely secondary 
to (and arguably at times is even precluded by) the identification of persistent and apparently 
insoluble contradictions within modern societies. Adorno’s (1972) theorisation of ‘negative 
dialectics’ constitutes perhaps the ultimate form of aporetic immanent critique, insofar as it 
‘…denies that there is an immanent logic to the actual that is emancipatory’ (Benhabib, 1986: 
173). In short, ‘Adorno rejects the logic of immanence, while preserving immanent critique’ 
(Benhabib, 1986: 173, emphasis in original).  
For some, most prominently for Jürgen Habermas, the latter move effectively 
constituted, if not an abandonment of immanent critique, then a blind alley, necessitating a 
revitalisation of normative critique on different terms (see Vaki 2005). But it is in this sense 
of an aporetic mode of immanent critique that we can understand Adorno’s identification of 
the ‘reconciling side of the irreconcilable’ and Marcuse’s diagnosis of submission to ‘the 
peaceful production of the means of destruction’. Marcuse’s own sense of incredulity at the 
‘willful play with fantastic possibilities’ (1964: 247) in itself constituted a refusal to accept 
the association of nuclear catastrophe with such imagery of scientific endeavour and human 
achievement. For both the nuclear age is replete with instances of such contradictions that fail 
to reduce to a straightforward resolution, but are instead perpetuated by a seemingly 
productive tensions and sustained by utopian visions of how nuclear technologies might be 
incorporated into and reconciled with industrial civilization. Their reflections on the advent 
of the nuclear age are aporetic in the sense that they are pervaded by a sense of perplexity at 
reconciling of life-destroying and life-sustaining tendencies. Here it is precisely the ‘promise’ 
of nuclear technologies to sustain and preserve life rather than their potential to destroy it 
comes to play an important part. The ‘willful play with fantastic possibilities’, Marcuse 
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suggests, soften and offset awareness of the capacity for global annihilation in the nuclear 
age. As the proceeding sections seek to illustrate, such a mode of analysis constitutes a 
particularly powerful way of understanding efforts to reconcile the ostensibly divergent 
applications of nuclear technologies. 
 
Atoms for peace 
While the classical realist diagnosis of the nuclear condition as articulated by Morgenthau 
and Herz arguably assumes nuclear weapons to be the defining technology of the modern era, 
efforts to differentiate and distinguish between nuclear things have been a persistent and 
continuing feature of the nuclear age right from its ‘beginning’. The idea that ‘the close 
technical parallelism and interrelation of the peaceful and the military applications of atomic 
energy ceases to be a difficulty, and becomes a help’ (Oppenheimer 1955 [1946]: 9) is, 
arguably, an understanding that has consistently remained at the core of post-World War II 
efforts to build and regulate an international nuclear order. Variations of it are to be found in 
the US Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan of 1946, the Soviet Gromyko plan of 
the same year, President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal as articulated in 1953, and 
the 1957 statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  
Sceptics, of course, doubt whether such initiatives were ever truly intended to curtail 
the development of and eliminate possession of nuclear weapons, and suggest that they were 
instead intended to obscure their continued development and possession. Thus for example, 
Craig and Radchenko argue that the Truman administration intentionally put forward the 
Baruch Plan in the knowledge that it would fail (2008: 125); Medhurst (1997) that 
Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ was intended to ‘distract’ the world audience away from the 
nuclearization of NATO. But even allowing for the above and questions of sincerity 
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notwithstanding, variations ‘Oppenheimer’s hope’ came to be central to post-War efforts to 
regulate the international nuclear order, with lasting practical implications. With the Atoms 
for Peace initiative in particular, Mara Drogan makes the case, a ‘nuclear imperative’ came to 
be a ‘pervasive mindset’ in the 1950s, in which ‘the expansion and use of nuclear technology 
for military and civilian purposes was both inevitable and necessary, and [it was assumed] 
that the United States must maintain its lead in the nuclear field, regardless of economic 
costs, technological complications, or questions of health, safety, and security’ (Drogan 2016: 
948; cf. Winkler 1993: 144-147). Eisenhower, in the address to the UN on 8 December 1953 
that launched the initiative, famously declared that:  
The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for 
military purposes […] The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-
up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the 
benefit of all mankind […] Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world’s scientists and 
engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their 
ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage? 
(Eisenhower 1953: np).  
Even if the subsequent implementation of the proposal fell short of a rapid, US-led global 
transformation of that destructive capacity into ‘universal, efficient and economic usage’ it 
nonetheless set in policy a progressive vision of nuclear power. Most importantly, and 
institutionalised in 1957 with the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the Atoms for Peace proposal established a continuum of ‘destructive’ and 
‘constructive’ applications of nuclear power, with efforts to constrain the former seen to be 
innately related to efforts to enable the latter. Thus Eisenhower proposed that the role of an 
international atomic energy agency should not only be to uphold a ‘system of world-wide 
inspection and control’ as regards military applications and to impound and store fissionable 
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material, but should also be put to work to ‘…devise methods whereby this fissionable 
material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts will be 
mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful 
activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-
starved areas of the world’ (Eisenhower 1953: np). 
Atoms for Peace thus established and institutionalised a particular kind of chain of 
association between different kinds of nuclear things, envisaging a specific international 
technopolitical configuration: ‘Atoms for peace remade US foreign and nuclear policy in the 
years to follow, [and] would reshape the political and technological map through the export 
of knowledge, fissionable material and equipment’ (Drogan 2016: 974). The application of 
atomic energy to agriculture, as advocated in Eisenhower’s speech, came to be a key part of 
wider efforts to ‘modernise’ agricultural production in developing countries in 1960s (see 
Hamblin 2009). The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
1957 established within the United Nations  ‘America’s drive to export the peaceful atom’, 
while the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
evaluation of Atoms for Peace in the 1950s ‘drew upon a host of existing notions about the 
relationship between social and technological progress’ (Hamblin 2006: 737).  
The nutopian political and scientific vision set out by Atoms for Peace was of course 
rearticulated in popular cultural manifestations too (for an extended discussion, see Winkler 
1993: 136-164). A classic example is Our Friend the Atom (1957), The Disney-fied version 
of the Atoms for Peace ideal that employed a retelling of the fable of the genie and the 
fisherman as a ‘motif for the atomic age’ (Winkler 1993: 140) and a jumping off point for 
introducing viewers to the basics of nuclear physics and a vision of atomic energy as the 
power source of the near future. Introduced by ‘Uncle Walt’ himself, the feature presented 
viewers with the fabled genie as a vehicle for understanding atomic power: dangerous upon 
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its initial release, but then tricked and contained again in the lamp, and eventually pressed 
into the service of the fisherman who pulled it out of the sea (Disney 1957: 0mins-7:41).  
At the heart of such characterisations ‘…was the bipolarity of weapons versus 
peaceful uses, the atomic genie who could be either menace or servant’ (Weart 1988: 88; 
2012: 170). In this configuration, applications of nuclear technologies in war, health, 
agriculture and energy were treated as distinct but crucially interrelated at one and the same 
time. Even the US development of the hydrogen bomb could not, it seemed, entirely displace 
the nutopian promise of the use of nuclear energy for the unlimited production of electricity 
as a particularly prominent application of Atoms for Peace. John von Neumann for example, 
one of the key architects of the H-bomb, would in 1955 reiterate the promise of nuclear 
(fusion) power amidst his more pessimistic prognosis of whether humanity could ‘survive’ 
technology (von Neumann 2013 [1955]). As Oppenheimer had sought to emphasise the 
‘constructive’ applications of atomic power in the years immediately after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, fission, von Neumann argued, ‘…is not nature’s normal way of releasing nuclear 
energy. In the long run, systematic industrial exploitation of nuclear energy may shift reliance 
onto other and still more abundant modes’.  In a variation of the ‘electricity too cheap to 
meter’ prediction3, von Neumann hypothesised that (on the proviso of ‘a decade of really 
large-scale industrial effort’ and a shift away from the focus on plutonium production as an 
objective) ‘It is likely that we shall gradually develop procedures more naturally and 
effectively adjusted to the new source of energy, abandoning the conventional kinks and 
detours inherited from chemical-fuel processes. Consequently, a few decades hence energy 
may be free – just like the unmetered air – with coal and oil used mainly as raw materials for 
organic chemical synthesis, to which, as experience has shown, their properties are best 
suited’ (von Neumann 2013 [1955]: np).  
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Elsewhere Edward Teller would in the late 1950s and into the 1960s advocate the 
envisioned use of nuclear explosives as ‘excavation technologies’ as a means to ‘…change 
the earth’s surface to suit us’ (cited in Kirsch 2005: 3). Although projected plans to carve out 
a Central American canal using atomic devices never came to pass (see Kirsch 2005; 
Kaufman 2012; Masco 2016: 58-60) the US Atomic Energy Commission’s ‘Project 
Plowshare’ foresaw and planned for the widespread ‘geographical engineering of continental 
river systems, dams, quarries, vast road cuts, and “nuclear blasted” instant harbors’ (Kirsch 
2005: 3). In perhaps the most obvious attempt to re-purpose nuclear weapons to 
‘constructive’ ends within the wider context of Atoms for Peace (see Kaufman 2012: 2-3), 
Plowshare ‘involved turning the planet into an imaginative space for nuclear engineering, as 
proponents sought a project big enough to sell to the mass public as well as to industry and 
government the idea of converting the bomb from weapon of mass destruction to engineering 
tool’ (Masco 2016: 58). 
 
How the atom benefits life 
Of course in the contemporary era ‘It is impossible to discuss “nuclear modernity” without 
also recording social challenges to such a vision’ (Irwin 2000: 84), and the early nutopianism 
of the Atoms for Peace era never went entirely uncontested (see Hamblin 2006: 734-735). 
Project Plowshare’s ‘dream’ (Kirsch 2005) of nuclear earthmoving as a shortcut to 
geoengineering was beset from the outset and ultimately curtailed by the protests of those that 
pointed out the radioactive and environmental hazards that would be created as a result. The 
promised ‘boon to all mankind’ central to the 1950s vision of the ‘peaceful atom’ still 
persists, not least for those that now argue that a ‘nuclear imperative’ exists in the need to 
replace consumption of fossil fuels (see, e.g., Cravens 2008; Eerkens 2006; various 
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contributors to Stone 2013; cf. Van Munster and Sylvest 2015). But such advocacy contends 
with the continuing public memory of events such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima, ongoing controversies over the disposal and storage of radioactive waste, and a 
record of the financial costs of developing nuclear power facilities that leaves little store in 
predictions of electricity too cheap to meter (Peoples 2016: 219; Hamblin  2006: 734-736).  
As ‘tarnished’ (see Lifton 2001: 27) by events of the intervening decades the nuclear 
utopianism of the 1950s may be, the centrality, recurrence and longevity of nutopianism as a 
feature of proposals for regulation of the nuclear condition  remains of interest precisely for 
that reason (see also Peoples 2016: 228-230). Indeed in some contexts, reiteration of the life-
sustaining potentialities of ‘the peaceful atom’ persist virtually to the point of banality. Thus 
for example this rendering remains a commonplace of debates on international nuclear 
governance and security (cf. Sonja D. Schmid’s discussion of ‘nuclear normalcy’ in this 
special issue). As well as often being articulated via extensive degrees of technical detail in, 
for example, discussion of nuclear ‘safeguards’ and ‘nuclear security’, it is commonly 
represented via a series of by now familiar tropes and metaphors as shorthand (see, 
especially, Kinsella 2005) that do the discursive ‘boundary work’ of designating legitimate 
and illegitimate applications of nuclear power. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is fundamentally premised (as is outlined in its preamble) on the 
‘need to make every effort to avert the danger of [nuclear] war’ going hand-in-hand with a 
commitment that ‘…the benefits of peaceful applications […] should be available for 
peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-
weapon States’ (UNODA 1968). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) likewise 
also continues to frame its animating purpose in relation to Atoms for Peace in the terms set 
out in its statute  ‘[to] seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’ and, concurrently, ‘[to] ensure, as far as it 
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is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose’ (IAEA 1956: np).  
The ‘Peaceful Uses Initiative’ of the IAEA represents the most obvious manifestation 
of this continuing promise to ‘save and ameliorate life’, in Marcuse’s terms, as a concomitant 
facet of the agency’s mission to prevent nuclear disaster. In particular a recent IAEA 
campaign (IAEA 2015) sets out to make the case that rather than being inherently dangerous 
or even exceptional, nuclear technologies can and are also being ‘…used world-wide to meet 
some of the fundamental needs of modern life’ (IAEA 2015: 1). Combining introductory 
animation with video footage, ‘How the Atom Benefits Life’ details how water, food, energy 
and health, as ‘the corner-stones of modern daily life’, can be ‘protected, provided and 
preserved through the use of nuclear technologies’.  The campaign suggests that ‘Using 
nuclear science, countries can manage their scarce water resources better’, and notes that 
‘The IAEA operates projects that use nuclear techniques to improve crop varieties and soil 
quality’ as well as promoting the ‘use of a technique to control pests that can destroy fruit and 
kill livestock’. In a global context of increasing energy demand, the IAEA ‘offers services for 
the safe and sustainable operation of reactors and helps countries to develop safe and secure 
control systems for radioactive sources’. With respect to health, ‘Nuclear techniques are used 
to support national nutritional programmes’, ‘Irradiation can make food safer by killing 
contaminants that can cause food poisoning’, and ‘Radiology is used to diagnose and manage 
disease, and radiotherapy to treat and cure it’ (IAEA 2015: 1-2). 
The campaign’s simple message is reiterated in closing: ‘Water – Food – Energy – 
Health: We need them now. In the future we’ll need them even more. Nuclear technologies 
help to ensure these fundamental needs are met for an ever-growing and developing 
population through the support of the IAEA’ (IAEA 2015: 2). While the ‘How the Atoms 
Benefits Life’ video, running at just under 6 minutes, provides little detail, elsewhere the 
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IAEA website sets out a series of accompanying ‘(IAEA) Impact Stories’ (IAEA 2016), 
among them: ‘Sri Lanka Proves Radioactivity Is Not an Issue in Its Coastal Waters’; ‘Plant 
Mutation Breeding Helps Bangladesh to Feed Its Growing Population’; ‘South Africa 
improves exclusive breastfeeding monitoring using nuclear techniques’; ‘Increasing Safety in 
Radioactive Waste Management’; ‘Making the World Safer, One Research Reactor at a 
Time’; ‘Water Protection Measures and Community Involvement Increase Sustainability of 
Uranium Mining in Tanzania’ (IAEA 2016: 1). 
The ‘How the Atom Benefits Life’ campaign thus functions as a continuation of the 
nutopian vision of Atoms for Peace, combining as it does more grandiose projections of the 
significance of nuclear technologies to the future health and prosperity of the human 
population with more everyday illustrations of the applications of such technologies. To 
return to Hecht’s definition of nuclearity the campaign should be understood within the 
context of the IAEA’s wider effort to manage a specific (international) political, cultural and 
institutional configuration of nuclear things. While actively working to contain the prospect 
‘death in the nuclear age’ in its activities to constrain nuclear proliferation and to promote the 
safety if nuclear facilities, the agency simultaneously continues to promote and exemplify the 
contributions of the ‘peaceful atom’ to human life and health.  
With regards to the latter it can of course reasonably be pointed out that radiation is 
part of human life. ‘Living things have evolved in an environment which has significant 
levels of ionising radiation’, the World Nuclear Association points out; ‘Furthermore, many 
of us owe our lives and health to such radiation produced artificially. Medical and dental X-
rays discern hidden problems, and some people are treated with radiation to cure disease. We 
all benefit from a multitude of products and services made possible by careful use of such 
radiation’ (World Nuclear Association, 2012: np).  Yet here we could mind Hecht’s 
differentiation of between radiation and nuclearity where ‘Radiation is a physical 
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phenomenon that exists independently of how it is detected or politicized’ but ‘nuclearity’ is 
a ‘…technopolitical phenomenon that emerges from political and cultural configurations of 
technical and scientific things’ (Hecht 2012: 15, emphasis in original; see also Schmid in this 
special issue). As Jacob Darwin Hamblin notes, when a 2011 IAEA factsheet on ‘Radiation 
and Everyday Life’ lists the multiple applications of radiation and nuclear techniques, it 
contextualizes these within an evaluation that ‘No human activity is devoid of associated 
risks. Radiation should be viewed from the perspective that the benefit from it to mankind is 
less harmful than from many other agents’ (cited in Hamblin 2012: 288). For Hamblin that 
way of conceiving of radiation ‘downplays’ the ‘significance of damage and thus abrogates 
responsibility for harm’. Rather than being a straightforward statement of fact, then, 
Hamblin’s argument suggests that such an evaluation is deeply politicised, part of an 
ingrained IAEA ‘outlook’ wherein ‘the future is nuclear, and we should set aside our 
objections’ (2012: 292).   
Conclusion 
Reflecting on Disney’s Our Friend the Atom and its allegory of the destructive genie freed 
and then tamed, the physicist and historian Spencer R. Weart argued the film’s central motif 
to be representative of a ‘history of images’ in which hopes and fears about the potential of 
nuclear power is all too commonly rendered and imagined via ‘archaic themes’ and ‘primal 
associations’ (1988: 73; 298). Weart’s work is regularly perforated by his ‘wish’ that ‘…we 
could have a moratorium on the archaic images that incite such emotions’ (Weart 1988: 430-
431; 2012: 304)4 and his sense that even otherwise coolheaded nuclear physicists too often 
indulged in the temptation to characterise nuclear power in either utopian or apocalyptic 
terms when they came to propose arrangements to control and manage the spread of nuclear 
technologies in the post-war decades. Instead of ‘grand schemes’ to govern the international 
nuclear order, Weart suggests that ‘solutions’ to the problem of nuclear energy should be 
 23 
 
‘…more complex and modest’ (1988: 429; cf. Weart 2012: 301) and that these kinds of 
bipolar characterisations of the ‘bad atom’ and the ‘good atom’ were and are thus particularly 
unhelpful. 
Yet Weart’s wide-ranging catalogue of the ‘imagery’ of the nuclear age perhaps in the 
process underestimates the significant and continuing role of a particular kind of nuclear 
narrative that maintains and institutionalises distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ atom in 
ways and in configurations that are often complex. The Atoms for Peace initiative and the 
How the Atom Benefits Life campaign can be considered as historical counterparts and 
comparisons in this respect. While both share the lasting diptych of ‘atoms for peace’ and 
‘atoms for war’, the How the Atom Benefits Life campaign is separated out from discussion 
of the IAEA’s activities in relation to nuclear weapons, and while the campaign references 
the potential for provision of electricity from nuclear energy it is grounded in case studies of 
contributions of radiation and nuclear techniques and technologies to everyday life rather 
than the grand claims of the Eisenhower era.   
The cases discussed here thus suggest subtle variations in the technopolitical 
phenomenon of nuclearity as manifested in efforts to govern the international nuclear order 
over time. Uniting both, though, is an association of destructive and productive application of 
nuclear science technologies that – as Sonja Schmid puts it elsewhere in this special issue – 
‘…rests on nearly incompatible interpretations of nuclear materiality’. In the promotion of 
Atoms for Peace, this association was made explicit from the outset – Eisenhower spoke of 
the ‘awful arithmetic’ (1953: np) that had been and could be further caused by the use of 
nuclear weapons in war, but sought to offset that against the scale of the benefits that could 
accrue from peaceful applications of nuclear power. With the How the Atoms Benefits Life 
campaign, the association is institutionalised within the IAEA itself rather than internal to the 
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campaign given that the IAEA is concerned with all things nuclear – weapons, energy and 
wider applications. 
Rather than separating out, then, discussions of ‘death’ and ‘life’ in the nuclear age, 
an approach based on immanent critique as outlined here might instead look to analyse how 
the two are associated and related to one another within proposals to manage and regulate the 
nuclear condition (cf Schmid in this issue). That approach is intimated in classical realist 
scholarship, is made more explicit in critical theoretic reflections, and can be extended into a 
concern with identifying different manifestations of nuclearity. Such a form of immanent 
critique may ultimately be aporetic – that is it may do more do highlight the ways in which 
proposals to manage and regulate the nuclear condition emphasise the ‘reconciling side of the 
irreconcilable’ (Adorno 1972: 343) rather than performing the feat of resolving the tensions 
between ‘atoms for peace’ and ‘atoms for war’. But in the process we might at least come to 
a better understanding of the antinomies and technopolitics of the nuclear condition, and of 
life in the nuclear age. 
Notes 
                                                          
1 Cf. the prologue to Hannah Arendt’s (1998 [1958]) where her reflections are contextualised not only against 
the backdrop of the launch of Sputnik into orbit in 1957, but also the claim that ‘politically, the modern world, in 
which we live today, was born with the first atomic explosions’ (Arendt 1998: 6).  
2 For Günther Anders, designated by some as ‘the philosopher of the atomic age’ (van Dijk 1994: 2), a focus on 
the threat of atomic weapons (Anders 1962) would later evolve to also include a ‘radical’ (Anders 1981) 
understanding of nuclear power plants as a distinct but equally symptomatic manifestation of ‘inverted 
utopianism’ (Anders 1962: 496): a misguided attempt to repurpose atomic energy in the continuing belief that it 
could power social and economic progress. Yet Anders’ evaluation of the nuclear condition also serves an 
interesting point of comparison and contrast to the Marcusian approach suggested here, with ‘the bomb’ 
arguably having even more prominence and centrality in Anders’ considerations of the ‘industrial revolution’ – 
cf the contribution by Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest to this special issue. 
3 Often attributed to Lewis Strauss, in remarks he made as Head of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
in 1954, although there is some debate as to whether Strauss used this exact phrase – see Peoples (2016: 218, 
fn8). 
4 A recent example that Weart would likely object to in this regard is the 2015 documentary film Storyville: 
Atomic: Living in Dread and Promise, directed by Mark Cousins, which splices together archival footage into 
‘…an impressionistic kaleidoscope of our nuclear times - protest marches, Cold War sabre-rattling, Chernobyl 
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and Fukushima - but also the sublime beauty of the atomic world, and how x-rays and MRI scans have 
improved human lives. The nuclear age has been a nightmare, but dreamlike too’ (BBC 2015: np). 
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